1 2 3	STATE OF NEW MEXICO ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS OFFICE TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT
4	MOHAMMED ABDUL MUQEET ADNAN
5	v. AHO Case Number 23.12-064A, D&O #25-01
6	NEW MEXICO TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT
7	DECISION AND ORDER
8	On May 3, 2024, Hearing Officer Ignacio V. Gallegos, Esq., conducted an administrative
9	hearing on the merits in the matter of the tax protest of Mohammed Abdul Muqeet Adnan
10	(Taxpayer) pursuant to the Tax Administration Act and the Administrative Hearings Office Act.
11	At the hearing conducted by video conference, Dr. Mohammed Abdul Muqeet Adnan appeared
12	on his own behalf. Staff Attorney Timothy Williams appeared, representing the opposing party
13	in the protest, the Taxation and Revenue Department (Department). Department protest auditor
14	Danny Pogan appeared as a witness for the Department. Both Taxpayer and Department exhibits
15	were presented and admitted as detailed in the Exhibit Log, by stipulation.
16	Based on the evidence in the record, and after making findings of fact, the hearing officer
17	finds that Taxpayer has failed to overcome the presumption of correctness that attached to the
18	Department's assessment. Taxpayer, a doctor, contended that as an independent contractor he
19	worked for two companies located out-of-state, although the service was delivered to patients in
20	New Mexico. The Department showed that the service was delivered in New Mexico at New
21	Mexico hospitals. Without sufficient evidence in support of Taxpayer's contention, the Taxpayer's
22	protest is therefore DENIED as to the tax and penalty. However, for reasons of tardiness in bringing
23	the matter to hearing, the accrual of interest is halted as of September 11, 2023.
24	IT IS DECIDED AND ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
	In the Matter of the Protest of Mohammed Abdul Muqeet Adnan, page 1 of 20.

resident of New Mexico. [Administrative file; Examination of Dr. Adnan].

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- Dr. Adnan is a physician. Taxpayer was, at the times pertinent to this protest, completing a medical fellowship program in New Mexico, occasionally taking on other work (referred to as "moonlighting") as his schedule allowed. [Administrative file; Examination of
- As part of his "moonlighting," Dr. Adnan performed services as a physician in New Mexico at two New Mexico health care facilities: Christus St. Vincent Regional Medical Center in Santa Fe, and Lovelace Medical Center in Albuquerque. He was compensated as an independent contractor. The medical staffing companies who hired Taxpayer are located outside of New Mexico, and they contracted with the New Mexico health care facilities at which Dr. Adnan took patients. [Administrative file; Examination of Dr. Adnan; Taxpayer Exhibit 2, 3, 4,
- Taxpayer received a Form-1099-Misc from CHG Companies, Inc, located in Salt Lake City, Utah for work performed in tax year 2016. The contract with CHG Companies, Inc. indicated to Taxpayer that the laws of Utah apply. [Examination of Dr. Adnan; Taxpayer
- Taxpayer received a Form-1099-Misc from CHG Companies, Inc, located in Midvale, Utah for work performed in tax year 2017 [Examination of Dr. Adnan; Taxpayer
- CHG Companies, Inc., through Continental Casualty Company, provided general liability insurance for Taxpayer, as an independent contractor, for work at Christus St. Vincent Regional Medical Center in Santa Fe, New Mexico. [Examination of Dr. Adnan; Taxpayer Exhibit 7].

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24. The protest auditor determined that no deduction should apply because the Taxpayer did not provide evidence to support a deduction. [Administrative file; Examination of D. Pogan].

DISCUSSION

Taxpayer Dr. Adnan is a physician who was living in New Mexico during the timeframes at issue. Taxpayer sold his services to an out-of-state service provider who resold his service to hospitals in New Mexico. Taxpayer was an independent contractor. Taxpayer argued that his services were provided to an out-of-state customer, though his patients were in New Mexico. As such, Taxpayer argued that the income he received was exempt from tax and therefore he did not have to file or pay gross receipts returns and taxes. For reasons detailed below, the Taxpayer's evidence failed to overcome the presumption of correctness which attached to the assessment.

Presumption of correctness

Under NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-17 (C) (2007), the assessment issued in this case is presumed correct. Accordingly, it is a taxpayer's burden to present some countervailing evidence or legal argument to show that they are entitled to an abatement, in full or in part, of the assessment issued in the protest. See N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't v. Casias Trucking, 2014-NMCA-099, ¶8. When a taxpayer presents sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, the burden shifts to the Department to show that the assessment is correct. See MPC Ltd. v. N.M. *Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 2003-NMCA-21, ¶13, 133 N.M. 217.

The Taxpayer's burden established under the presumption of correctness is a burden of producing evidence that tends to support Taxpayer's position. Gemini Las Colinas, LLC v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department, 2023-NMCA-039, ¶ 16, 531 P.3d 622. Once the

The burden is also on taxpayers to prove that they are entitled to an exemption or deduction, if one should potentially apply. *See Pub. Serv. Co. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 2007-NMCA-050, ¶141 N.M. 520, 157 P.3d 85; *See also Till v. Jones*, 1972-NMCA-046, 83 N.M. 743, 497 P.2d 745. "Where an exemption or deduction from tax is claimed, the statute must be construed strictly in favor of the taxing authority, the right to the exemption or deduction must be clearly and unambiguously expressed in the statute, and the right must be clearly established by the taxpayer." *See Sec. Escrow Corp. v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 1988-NMCA-068, ¶8, 107 N.M. 540, 760 P.2d 1306; *see also Wing Pawn Shop v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 1991-NMCA-024, ¶16, 111 N.M. 735, 809 P.2d 649; *see also Chavez v. Comm'r of Revenue*, 1970-NMCA-116, ¶7, 82 N.M. 97, 476 P.2d 67.

Receipts under the Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act.

The assessment in this protest arises from an application of the Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 7-9-1 through 7-9-117, which imposes a tax for the privilege of engaging in business, on the receipts of any person engaged in business in New Mexico. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-4 (2010). The Department issued its assessment following a comparison between the Taxpayer's income reported on his federal Schedule Cs for tax years 2016 and 2017 and the Taxpayer's gross receipts tax CRS-1 returns for the same time frame. The comparison revealed Taxpayer had not filed CRS-1 returns to report gross receipts, nor did Taxpayer pay gross receipts taxes for the years at issue.

The statutory definition of "gross receipts" under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.5 (A)(1) (effective June 15, 2007, to June 30, 2019) states, in pertinent part: "'gross receipts' means the total amount of money or the value of other consideration received from selling property in New Mexico, ... or from performing services in New Mexico." There is a statutory presumption that all receipts of a person engaged in business activities are taxable. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-5(A) (2019). The activity of providing independent contractor services as a physician was engaging in business which triggers the statutory presumption that *all receipts* of a person engaging in business are taxable. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3(P) (2019), Section 7-9-3.3 (2019), and Section 7-9-5(A) (2019). Yet, despite the general presumption of taxability, a taxpayer may qualify for the benefits of various deductions and exemptions.

Here, facts are not in dispute. Taxpayer performed medical services while living and working in New Mexico, at New Mexico hospitals, for New Mexican patients. Payment by Taxpayer's employer for his services, however, did not come from the patients nor from the hospitals at which he worked, but through two distinct third-party medical staffing companies, with offices located outside of New Mexico. Taxpayer claims that this arrangement resulted in an exemption under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-13.1 (effective 1989 to June 30, 2021)¹, which provides an exemption for "receipts from selling services performed outside New Mexico the product of which is initially used in New Mexico."

Territoriality is essential in a determination of taxability. States have broad jurisdiction over the economic activity *within* the territory of the state. Receipts for services performed in New Mexico are taxable as gross receipts. *See* Section 7-9-3.5 (2019); *see also* Regulation 3.2.1.14 (A)(4) NMAC (9/25/2018). Receipts for services performed outside the state are generally not

¹ This exemption has been limited significantly after the enactment of revisions in 2021.

taxable in New Mexico as gross receipts. *See Talbridge Corporation v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department*, 2024-NMCA-044, ¶ 11, 550 P.3d 901; *see also* Regulation 3.2.1.18 (E) (effective 2012-2021). The location of the performance of the service is the starting point.

Taxpayer argued that since the payment for his services came from outside of New Mexico, his service was performed for the customer, the payor, therefore the service transaction was performed outside of New Mexico. Regulation 3.2.1.18 (E) and (H) (effective 2012-2021) provide negative examples which are analogous to the Taxpayer's claim.

Regulation 3.2.1.18 (E)(4) provides this example:

L, an Albuquerque attorney, is retained by a Colorado firm to negotiate and draw up oil and gas leases for lands in southern Colorado. To accomplish this objective, L goes to Pueblo, Colorado, and there negotiates and draws the leases. Receipts from the fee are not includable in L's gross receipts because the service was performed entirely outside the state of New Mexico.

In the context of gross receipts taxation, the practice of medicine and the practice of law are analogous as personal services. The physical locations of the people providing the service and those receiving the service are important. Similarly, Regulation 3.2.1.18 (H) provides that "[r]egardless of the source of payment... the fees of attorneys are subject to the gross receipt tax to the extent that their services are performed in this state." These regulations appear to preclude Taxpayer's argument that the source of payment from outside of New Mexico justifies an exemption from gross receipt tax for the services he personally provided in Santa Fe and Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, presume the Taxpayer's theory of the case is correct and his service was provided to the company paying for it at the company's headquarters outside of New Mexico. In such an instance, the service, under Taxpayer's theory of the protest, would not be taxable under the definition of gross receipts which requires that the service be provided "in New Mexico." NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.5 (A)(1) (effective June 15, 2007, to June 30, 2019). This

presumption which Taxpayer encourages contradicts longstanding jurisprudence. *See ITT Educational Services, Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Department*, 1998-NMCA-078, 959 P.2d 969 (a brick-and-mortar school in New Mexico, operated by a corporation outside of New Mexico, providing educational services in New Mexico was subject to GRT); *cf. Advance Schools, Incorporated v. Bureau of Revenue*, 1976-NMSC-007; 547 P.2d 562 (correspondence school outside of New Mexico did not incur gross receipts for the educational service provided from outside New Mexico). In both *ITT* and *Advance Schools*, the courts focused on where the service contracted for was performed. Applying the same rationale to the facts of the case before the hearing officer, the service contracted for (i.e., medical services) was conducted in New Mexico, and would therefore be subject to gross receipts tax reporting and payment.

Next, considering the exemption of Section7-9-13.1, there are two aspects to the statute: first, the performance of the service must be outside the state, and second, the product of the service must be delivered in New Mexico. In the case of *TPL*, *Inc. v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department*, 2003-NMSC-007, 64 P.3d 474, the New Mexico Supreme Court attempted to identify or define what the service was, and what the product of the service was, before applying the exemption. In *TPL*, the court found that the "product of the service" is generally "the direct result or consequence flowing from the service." *Id.* at ¶ 12. The court went on to say, that the "product of the service" depends on "what benefit the buyer received – what the buyer paid for." The court also acknowledged that some benefits are intangible, using the example of the service resulting from a patient of a psychologist. *Id.*

Had this been a standard arrangement that may have existed in the mid-20th century, where a doctor sees a patient, and the patient pays for the visit, this would be a different discussion. But here, the direct buyer is not the patient. The direct buyer here is the medical staffing company, who

In the practice of the healing arts, a practitioner must use their own skill, knowledge, and experience with a patient to provide independent and individualized assessments and advice. In the realm of taxation, there are two main classifications for individuals who receive compensation in exchange for services: employees receiving form W-2; and independent contractors receiving 1099s. IRS Publication 15-A states "People such as doctors, veterinarians, and auctioneers who work in an independent trade, business, or profession in which they offer their services to the public are generally not employees ... The general rule is that an individual is an independent contractor if you, the person for whom the services are performed, have the right to control or direct only the result of the work and not the means and methods of accomplishing the result." Likewise, in New Mexico, "[a]n independent contractor is defined as 'a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking." *Talbott v. Roswell*

The exemption for "receipts from selling services performed outside New Mexico the product of which is initially used in New Mexico." NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-13.1 (effective 1989) to June 30, 2021) is not applicable here, because the service of providing medical treatment was performed in New Mexico, not outside of New Mexico.

Finally, there was a hint that Taxpayer's services may be deductible as a sale of a service for resale, under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-48 and Regulation 3.2.206 NMAC. However, Taxpayer did not argue the applicability, nor did Taxpayer provide non-taxable transaction certificates or other evidence that another taxpayer would be paying the gross receipts tax.

Penalty.

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Dr. Adnan did not know he was required to file and pay gross receipts tax returns but had no obvious intention to evade a tax. Under NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-69 (2007), when a taxpayer fails to pay taxes due to the State because of negligence or disregard of rules and regulations, but without intent to evade or defeat a tax, the Department must impose a civil negligence penalty on that taxpayer. "There shall be added to the amount assessed a penalty" under the statute. *Id*.

The use of the word "shall" makes the imposition of penalty mandatory in all instances where a taxpayer's actions or inactions meets the legal definition of "negligence." *See Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n*, 2009-NMSC-013, ¶22, 146 N.M. 24 (use of the word "shall" in a statute indicates provision is mandatory absent clear indication to the contrary).

Negligence can be found in several ways. Regulation 3.1.11.10 NMAC (1/15/01) defines "negligence" as "failure to exercise that degree of ordinary business care and prudence which reasonable taxpayers would exercise under like circumstances; inaction by taxpayers where action is required; inadvertence, indifference, thoughtlessness, carelessness, erroneous belief or inattention." Not filing gross receipts tax returns or paying the taxes on time is certainly negligence by inaction where action is required under this definition. Imposition of penalty was proper.

Interest.

NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-67 (2013) provides that interest accrues on deficient tax principal. Interest "shall be paid" on taxes that are not paid on or before the date on which the tax is due.

NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-67 (A). By the use of the word "shall" the legislature intended that the assessment of interest is mandatory. *See Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n.*, 2009-NMSC-013, ¶ 22, 146 N.M. 24; *see also* NMSA 1978, Section 12-2A-4 (A) (1997). Likewise, under Regulation 3.1.6.13 NMAC, the presumption of correctness under Section 7-1-17 (C) extends to the Department's assessment of penalty and interest. *See* Regulation 3.1.6.13 NMAC

Nevertheless, the legislature also enacted time deadlines to ensure timely disposition of tax protests. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-1B-8 (2019). The Department's failure to adhere to statutory time deadlines can result in the stay of accrual of interest. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-1B-8 (E). Regulations allow the hearing officer, upon request of the taxpayer or on their own initiative, to review whether the Department satisfied applicable statutory requirements, and if finding the Department did not, to stay the accrual of interest. *See* Regulation 22.600.3.18 (E) (8/25/2020). In this instance, the Taxpayer asked for review and the Department argued for finding the Department in compliance with the time deadlines.

Beginning with the date of the Taxpayer's protest, submitted to the Department on February 22, 2023. Thereafter, on May 31, 2023, the Department issued a letter acknowledging a timely protest of the Notice of Assessment – a delay of 98 days. Then, on December 1, 2023, the Department filed a Request for Hearing – an additional delay of 185 days. The total delay between the Taxpayer's submission of the protest and the Department's request for hearing was 283 days. The Hearing Officer, in a separate Decision and Order, expressed dismay at a delay of 309 days and *sua sponte* halted the accrual of further interest, following NMSA 1978, Section 7-1B-8 (E) (2019) and Regulation 22.600.3.18 (E) NMAC (8/25/2020). *See In the Matter of the Protest of Jimmy Lopez*, D & O #24-03 (non-precedential).

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A review is warranted here. There are two deadlines of note under the 2019 statute, "[i]f the hearing officer finds that the taxation and revenue department failed to comply with the deadlines set forth in Subsections A and B of this section, the hearing officer may order that no further interest may accrue on the protested liability." NMSA 1978, Section 7-1B-8 (E) (2019); *see also* Regulation 22.600.3.18 (E) (8/25/2020).

Beginning with Section A of the statute, the Department is required to promptly issue an acknowledgement of the protest. Here, the Taxpayer's protest form was dated February 22, 2023, however, there is no received stamp showing the date the Department received the form. The Department issued an acknowledgement of protest on May 31, 2023. A simple calculation indicates that the acknowledgment of protest was dated 98 days after the protest was sent to the Department. A determination of "promptness" is certainly a subjective standard, and the hearing officer may take into account a variety of factors that might contribute to a delay. Regulation 22.600.3.18 (E) (8/25/2020). The statute provides "[i]f the department determines that the protest has not been filed in accordance with that section [7-1-24 NMSA 1978], the department shall, within twenty-one days of the receipt of the protest, inform the taxpayer of the deficiency and provide the taxpayer within twenty-one days of the taxpayer being informed, one opportunity to correct it." There is no evidence on record that the Department found fault with the initial submission of the protest for the tax years in question, therefore, a prompt acknowledgment should have occurred within this 21-day graceperiod. The record is void as to whether there was any behind-the-scenes activity that might have justified a delay of longer than 21-days such as, for example, holding an informal conference or making amendments to the protest. Because of the relatively uncomplicated nature of the case and no evidence of behind-the-scenes activity, a delay of 98 days cannot be found to be prompt, as it should have occurred within 21-days of the receipt of the protest.

Turning then to Section B, the Department has one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the protest, within which to request a hearing. Regulations identify the date, on which the 180 days begin, to be the date of the prompt acknowledgment of protest. *See* Regulation 22.600.3.8 NMAC. In this case, the Taxpayer's initial protest was stamped as sent to the Department on February 22, 2023. The Department issued an acknowledgment of protest outside the 21-day boundary of promptness articulated by the Legislature, on May 31, 2023, then submitted its request for hearing on December 1, 2023. A simple calculation indicates that the request for hearing was filed 185 days after the actual acknowledgement of protest, and a total of 283 days from the initial protest. By filing the request for hearing after the expiration of the 180-day deadline, the Department did not comply with the statutory deadline expressed under 7-1B-8 (B). Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the Department failed to comply with deadline set forth in Subsection B of Section 7-1B-8.

New Mexico law imposes time limits to expedite the adjudication of protests. The law allows "[i]f the hearing officer finds that the taxation and revenue department failed to comply with the deadlines set forth in Subsections A and B of this section, the hearing officer may order that no further interest may accrue on the protested liability." NMSA 1978, Section 7-1B-8 (E) (2019). Here, the Department's acknowledgment of the protest was not prompt, a violation of Section A. Likewise, the Department's filing of the request for hearing, was greater than 180 days from its actual issuance of the acknowledgement of protest letter, so it also violated Section B. Therefore, the Department failed to comply with the deadlines as set forth by the legislature, and the imposition of a stay of accrual of interest is justified.

The date at which the halting or suspension of accrual of interest shall be effective, is, according to the regulation, "the day after the date on which TRD should have, but did not act, or

Generally, there is a 21-day grace period from the receipt of a tax protest. *See* Section 7-1B-8 (A). During this time, a protest may be evaluated by the Department for adherence to Section 7-1-24 requirements. If there is no issue with the protest, the prompt acknowledgement should be before the expiration of the 21-day grace period. The request for hearing should be submitted to the Administrative Hearings Office within 180-days thereafter. Since there have been no reasons articulated or provided in the record for additional delay, the Department should have acted to request a hearing within 201 days after receipt of the Taxpayer's protest. The receipt of the protest was February 22, 2023. Adding 201 days to that date, the Department's request for hearing should have occurred on or before September 11, 2023. The date on which the stay shall cease to accrue is the date "on which TRD should have, but did not act." Regulation 22.600.3.18 (E). The accrual of interest shall be halted as of September 11, 2023, the date on which the Department should have but did not act.

Conclusion

The Taxpayer provided medical services in New Mexico. Under the broad umbrella of the gross receipts tax, payment received as payment for a medical service is expressly taxable, as "fees derived from ... the business of... selling ... any... service." Section 7-9-3.5 (A)(2)(b). The Taxpayer's work as an independent contractor was compensated and reported to the IRS using Form 1099-Misc, and Taxpayer was responsible for reporting and paying gross receipts on his business income, as reported on his federal Schedule C. Taxpayer did not qualify for the benefits of the exemption under Section 7-9-13.1.

However, because the Department delayed 283 days between the protest and the request for hearing, with no activity to show it acted promptly, the accrual of interest is halted, as of September 11, 2023. The protest is denied in part and granted in part.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

- A. The Taxpayer filed a timely written protest to the Notice of Assessment of Tax and Demand for Payment issued under Letter ID number L1224570992, and jurisdiction lies over the parties and the subject matter of this protest. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-24 (D) (2019); *see also* NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-1, *et seq.* ("Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act").
- B. The hearing was timely set and held within 90-days of the Department's request for hearing under NMSA 1978, Section 7-1B-8 (F) (2019). Parties did not object that the scheduling hearing satisfied the 90-day hearing requirement of Section 7-1B-8 (F). *See also* Regulation 22.600.3.8 (J) NMAC (8/25/20).
- C. Any assessment of tax made by the Department is presumed to be correct. Therefore, it is the taxpayer's burden to come forward with evidence and legal argument to establish that the Department's assessment should be abated, in full or in part. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-17 (C) (2007).
- D. "Tax" is defined to include not only the tax program's principal, but also interest and penalty. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-3 (Z) (2019). Assessments of penalties and interest therefore also receive the benefit of a presumption of correctness. *See* Regulation 3.1.6.13 NMAC (1/15/01).
- E. Taxpayer bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness that attached to the Department's Assessment. Taxpayer presented no evidence that his independent contractor services as a physician were performed outside of New Mexico, and was unable to overcome the presumption of correctness. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-17 (C) (2007); *see also*

1	Regulation 3.1.8.10 NMAC (08/30/2001); see also Gemini Las Colinas, LLC v. New Mexico
2	Taxation & Revenue Department, 2023-NMCA-039, ¶ 16, 531 P.3d 622; see also Regulation
3	3.1.6.12 NMAC; see also MPC Ltd. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2003-NMCA-021, ¶13,
4	133 N.M. 217, 62 P.3d 308; see also Regulation 3.1.6.12 (A) NMAC (1/15/01).
5	F. The Taxpayer's evidence and legal argument, weighed against the Department's
6	evidence and legal argument was insufficient to find by a preponderance of evidence that
7	Taxpayer was entitled to a deduction under Section 7-9-13.1 (effective 1989 to June 30, 2021).
8	See NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-18 (C) (2021); see also Gemini Las Colinas, LLC v. New Mexico
9	Taxation & Revenue Department, 2023-NMCA-039, ¶ 29, 531 P.3d 622.
10	G. The Department failed to issue a prompt acknowledgement of protest and a timely
11	request for hearing on the protest without good cause shown. See NMSA 1978, Section 7-1B-8
12	(A) and (B); see also Regulation 22.600.3.18 (E). The accrual of additional interest is halted as
13	of the date on which the Department should have but did not act. See Regulation 22.600.3.18 (E).
14	For the foregoing reasons, the Taxpayer's protest IS DENIED IN PART AND
15	GRANTED IN PART.
16	DATED: January 8, 2025
17 18 19 20 21 22	Ignacio V. Gallegos Hearing Officer Administrative Hearings Office Post Office Box 6400 Santa Fe, NM 87502

1 NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 2 Pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-25 (2015), the parties have the right to appeal this 3 decision by filing a notice of appeal with the New Mexico Court of Appeals within 30 days of the 4 date shown above. If an appeal is not timely filed with the Court of Appeals within 30 days, this 5 Decision and Order will become final. Rule of Appellate Procedure 12-601 NMRA articulates 6 the requirements of perfecting an appeal of an administrative decision with the Court of Appeals. 7 Either party filing an appeal shall file a courtesy copy of the appeal with the Administrative 8 Hearings Office contemporaneous with the Court of Appeals filing so that the Administrative 9 Hearings Office may begin preparing the record proper. The parties will each be provided with a 10 copy of the record proper at the time of the filing of the record proper with the Court of Appeals, 11 which occurs within 14 days of the Administrative Hearings Office receipt of the docketing 12 statement from the appealing party. See Rule 12-209 NMRA. **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** 13 14 On January 8, 2025, a copy of the foregoing Decision and Order was submitted to the 15 parties listed below in the following manner: First Class Mail E-Mail 16 First Class Mail and E-Mail 17 18 19 INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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