1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO 2 ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS OFFICE 3 TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT THOMAS RICHARDS 4 5 AHO Case Number 23.08-031A, D&O #24-13 v. 6 NEW MEXICO TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT 7 **DECISION AND ORDER** 8 On February 27, 2024, Hearing Officer Ignacio V. Gallegos, Esq., conducted an 9 administrative hearing on the merits in the matter of the tax protest of Thomas Richards 10 (Taxpayer) pursuant to the Tax Administration Act and the Administrative Hearings Office Act. 11 At the hearing, Thomas Richards appeared, accompanied by his authorized representative Steven Bartlett, an employee of a New Mexico licensed CPA firm, Axiom CPAs. Staff Attorney 12 13 Cordelia Friedman appeared, representing the opposing party in the protest, the Taxation and 14 Revenue Department (Department). Department protest auditor Nicholas Pacheco appeared as a 15 witness for the Department. Both Taxpayer and Department exhibits were presented and 16 admitted or withdrawn as detailed in the Exhibit Log. 17 Based on the evidence in the record, and after making findings of fact, the hearing officer 18 finds that Taxpayer has failed to overcome the presumption of correctness that attached to the 19 Department's assessment. Taxpayer contended that the underlying transactions from which his 20 commissions were derived were not subject to tax, but provided no evidence of the underlying 21 transactions, with little to no information about the manufacturers/wholesalers and retailers he 22 derived commissions from. The Department argued that although the underlying transactions 23 between manufacturer and retailer may have not been taxed if the sellers had been using NTTCs, 24 the final transaction of retailer to end user is taxed, therefore the Taxpayer's commissions on sales

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to retailers are not the type contemplated as deductible under NMSA Section 7-9-47 or Section 7-9-1 2 66. Without sufficient evidence in support of Taxpayer's contention, the Taxpayer's protest is 3 therefore DENIED. 4 IT IS DECIDED AND ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 5 FINDINGS OF FACT 6 **Procedural findings** 7 1. On May 15, 2022, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Assess – Gross 8 Receipts to Taxpayer for the gross receipts tax reporting periods beginning January 1, 2016 and 9 ending December 31, 2019, based on a Federal Schedule C mismatch. [Exhibit #1; 10 Administrative file]. 2. 11 On July 14, 2022, Taxpayer submitted a letter to the Department indicating that 12 he did not believe he was required to pay gross receipts tax for income earned out-of-state.¹ 13 [Administrative file; Exhibit #2.8]. 3. 14 On October 31, 2022, the Department issued a Notice of Assessment of Taxes and 15 Demand for Payment for the gross receipts tax reporting periods beginning January 1, 2016 and 16 ending December 31, 2019. The assessment was for audit gross receipts tax of \$24,371.78, 17 penalty of \$4,874.28, and interest of \$4,062.28, for a total assessment due of \$33,309.03. [Letter 18 ID# L0169584752; Exhibit #3]. 19 4. On September 20, 2022, Taxpayer prepared a Tax Information Authorization, 20 permitting Steven Bartlett, Axiom CPAs, access to his tax information. [Administrative file].

¹ While Taxpayer raised the issue of out-of-state income within the protest letter, the issue was not raised in the prehearing statement, nor at the hearing. No evidence to support a claim of out-of-state earnings was presented at the hearing, and therefore the issue is presumed to have been abandoned.

- 5. On January 11, 2023, the Taxpayer's representative submitted a letter of protest to the Department's protest office email alleging that receipts generated from commissions for sales between manufacturers and retailers of tangible personal property were not taxable.

 [Administrative file].
- 6. On February 8, 2023, the Department issued a letter acknowledging a timely protest of the Notice of Assessment. [Administrative file; Letter ID# L1774429296].
- 7. On August 3, 2023, the Department filed a Request for Hearing asking that the Taxpayer's protest be scheduled for a scheduling hearing, alleging the amount at protest was \$33,309.03. [Administrative file].
- 8. On August 3, 2023, the Department filed an Answer to Protest asserting that the Taxpayer must report and pay gross receipts taxes on business income for Taxpayer's New Mexico income from commissions. The failure to file and pay gross receipts taxes was discovered because Taxpayer reported Schedule C income without filing corresponding gross receipts and compensating tax returns. [Administrative file].
- 9. On August 7, 2023, the Administrative Hearings Office sent a Notice of Telephonic Scheduling Hearing, giving the parties notice that a scheduling hearing would take place by telephone on August 25, 2023. The Notice of Telephonic Scheduling Hearing was sent to the parties' representative's addresses and email addresses. [Administrative file].
- 10. On August 25, 2023, the undersigned Hearing Officer conducted a telephonic scheduling hearing. Taxpayer's representative Steven Bartlett appeared at the scheduling hearing. The Department was represented by Staff Attorney Cordelia Friedman. The parties present did not object that the hearing satisfied the 90-day hearing requirement of Section 7-1B-8 (F) (2019). [Administrative file; Hearing Record of August 25, 2023].

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- 25. One manufacturer, Lucchese Inc., provided a letter detailing the commission arrangement with Taxpayer. [Administrative file; Examination of T. Richards; Exhibit 7].
- 26. The exhibit from Lucchese Inc. shows the name, address, FEIN, and a New Mexico Tax ID number for Lucchese Inc., along with a short description of the sales commission compensation agreement with Taxpayer. [Administrative file; Examination of T. Richards; Exhibit 7].
- 27. The exhibit from Lucchese Inc., in pertinent part, says: "Mr. Richards represented Lucchese in identifying new and managing existing relationships with third-party western wear retailers in the region. He then arranges for those retailers to purchase products from Lucchese, which the retailers then resold to their end-user customers. All compensation paid to Mr. Richards came in the form of commissions earned for the wholesale transactions he facilitated." It goes on to a second page which provides the following: "Statement of Activities: During the period in question by the State of New Mexico, Tom Richards was an independent salesperson compensated solely on a commission basis. Lucchese manufactures and distributes western wear to retailers. The retailers would then sell the merchandise to their customers. Mr. Richard's [sic] commissions were directly related to Lucchese's sales." Notably, there is nothing concerning taxation in the letter, nor is there an accounting of the commissions paid to Taxpayer for his services. [Administrative file; Exhibit 7].
- 28. The Taxpayer had other clients, in addition to Lucchese Inc. [Administrative file; Examination of T. Richards; Exhibit 7].
- 29. When a retailer makes an order from one of the manufacturers whom Mr. Richards represents, the fulfillment of the order is directly between the manufacturer and the retailer. Mr. Richards does not take possession of the goods from the manufacturer, nor does he

the wholesaler and the retailer are not parties to the action against the Taxpayer and the Department is not at liberty to disclose other taxpayer information, including whether NTTCs have been delivered. [Administrative file; Examination of N. Pacheco].

38. When a retailer delivers an NTTC to a wholesaler, the NTTC contains an affirmative statement from the retailer that the retailer will go on to resell the product and pay the tax on the sale. [Administrative file; Examination of N. Pacheco].

DISCUSSION

Taxpayer Thomas Richards is a salesman who does business in New Mexico as an independent contractor. Mr. Richards connects and maintains relationships between western wear manufacturers/wholesalers with western wear retailers. For this service, he receives a commission for the sales he facilitates. Taxpayer argued that the sales between the manufacturer and the retailer are not subject to tax, under New Mexico's non-taxable transaction certificate (NTTC) structure, and the commissions Taxpayer received from manufacturers for facilitating these transactions are also not subject to tax. The Department argued that because the retail sales of the western wear are ultimately subject to gross receipts tax when sold to the ultimate buyer, the commissions for the service of facilitating sales between manufacturers and retailers are not the type of commissions contemplated by New Mexico law to be deductible. For reasons detailed below, the Taxpayer's evidence failed to overcome the presumption of correctness which attached to the assessment.

Presumption of correctness

Under NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-17 (C) (2007), the assessment issued in this case is presumed correct. Accordingly, it is a taxpayer's burden to present some countervailing evidence

The Taxpayer's burden established under the presumption of correctness is a burden of producing evidence that tends to support Taxpayer's position. *Gemini Las Colinas, LLC v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department*, 2023-NMCA-039, ¶ 16, 531 P.3d 622. Once the Taxpayer has produced the evidence in support of Taxpayer's position, the Department may present its evidence in support of the assessment, then it is the responsibility of the Hearing Officer to weigh the evidence and determine the outcome of the protest. *Id.*, ¶ 17.

The burden is also on taxpayers to prove that they are entitled to an exemption or deduction, if one should potentially apply. *See Pub. Serv. Co. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 2007-NMCA-050, ¶141 N.M. 520, 157 P.3d 85; *See also Till v. Jones*, 1972-NMCA-046, 83 N.M. 743, 497 P.2d 745. "Where an exemption or deduction from tax is claimed, the statute must be construed strictly in favor of the taxing authority, the right to the exemption or deduction must be clearly and unambiguously expressed in the statute, and the right must be clearly established by the taxpayer." *See Sec. Escrow Corp. v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 1988-NMCA-068, ¶8, 107 N.M. 540, 760 P.2d 1306; *see also Wing Pawn Shop v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 1991-NMCA-024, ¶16, 111 N.M. 735, 809 P.2d 649; *see also Chavez v. Comm'r of Revenue*, 1970-NMCA-116, ¶7, 82 N.M. 97, 476 P.2d 67.

Receipts from Commissions under the Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act.

The assessment in this protest arises from an application of the Gross Receipts and Compensating Tax Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 7-9-1 through 7-9-117, which imposes a tax for the privilege of engaging in business, on the receipts of any person engaged in business in New Mexico. *See* NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-4 (2010). The Department issued its assessment following a comparison between the Taxpayer's income reported on his federal Schedule Cs for tax years 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 and the Taxpayer's gross receipts tax CRS-1 returns for the same time frame. The comparison revealed Taxpayer had not filed CRS-1 returns to report gross receipts, nor did Taxpayer pay gross receipts taxes for the years at issue.

Taxpayer's Schedule C income was derived from sales commissions from the sale of western wear. The statutory definition of "gross receipts" under Section 7-9-3.5 (A)(1) (effective June 15, 2007, to June 30, 2019) states, in pertinent part: "gross receipts' means the total amount of money or the value of other consideration received from selling property in New Mexico, ... or from performing services in New Mexico." The section goes on to say, "gross receipts" includes "the total commissions or fees derived from the business of buying, selling or promoting the purchase, sale or lease, as an agent or broker on a commission or fee basis, of any property, service, stock, bond or security." NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.5 (A)(2)(b).

Under the broad umbrella of the gross receipts tax, commissions received as payment for a service are expressly taxable, as "promoting the purchase" as an "agent or broker" of the manufacturer, on a "commission or fee basis" of "any property" offered by the manufacturers to retailers. Section 7-9-3.5 (A)(2)(b).

The statutory definition of "engaging in business" is "carrying on or causing to be carried on any activity with the purpose of direct or indirect benefit." NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-3.3 (2019). The business activity of connecting manufacturers/wholesalers to retailers for commercial sales in

New Mexico for the personal benefit of receiving commissions was engaging in business which triggers the statutory presumption that all receipts of a person engaging in business are taxable. *See* Section 7-9-3(P) (2019), Section 7-9-3.3 (2019), and Section 7-9-5(A) (2019). Yet, despite the general presumption of taxability, a taxpayer may qualify for the benefits of various deductions and exemptions.

Taxpayer's evidence in support of claims for deduction under Section 7-9-66.

Taxpayer asserted that his commissions fell into the category of "[r]eciepts derived from commissions of sales of tangible personal property which are not subject to the gross receipts tax." Section 7-9-66. The statute has three prongs, first, that the receipts are derived from commissions; second, that the commissions are from sales of tangible personal property; and third, that the sales are not subject to the gross receipts tax. After satisfying all three prongs, the receipts of a commission-based salesperson may be deducted from gross receipts.

Taxpayer provided evidence that his receipts, at least from Lucchese, are derived from commissions, satisfying the first prong of Section 7-9-66. He provided proof that the sales, at least from Lucchese, were of goods (western wear) which are tangible personal property, satisfying the second prong of Section 7-9-66.

However, Taxpayer struggled to provide any documentary, testimonial, or other evidence that the underlying sales transactions between manufacturer and retailer were "not subject to the gross receipts tax," the third prong of Section 7-9-66. The only document purported to support this claim was the letter from Lucchese, Inc. The letter from Lucchese, Inc. (a manufacturer/wholesaler) describes the arrangement between Taxpayer and Lucchese, Inc. whereby Lucchese paid Taxpayer a commission for sales of Lucchese's products to retailers.

The letter does not describe any tax agreement between the Taxpayer and Lucchese, or between Lucchese and its retailers as customers. Nor does it provide evidence that the underlying transactions were not taxable, which is the crux of the Taxpayer's contention. The letter does not claim that the manufacturer sought or obtained nontaxable transaction certificates (NTTCs) for the transactions negotiated by Taxpayer. The letter does not assign a dollar value to the commissions earned by Taxpayer from this manufacturer during the timeframes at issue. The letter does not name any retailer who purportedly resold the merchandise.

Ordinarily, it is not the role of the Hearing Officer to determine the taxability of transactions involving non-parties to a dispute, however, a brief overview of the underlying transaction's structure is necessary in this case, as it pertains to whether the underlying sales transaction is taxable, to satisfy the third prong of Section 7-9-66. *See In the Matter of the Protest of Vidia Wesenlund*, Decision and Order # 16-28, issued June 21, 2016 (non-precedential) ("Before determining whether Taxpayer owes gross receipts on her commissions, a determination must be made whether the underlying transactions, the sales..., are taxable.").

The facts available in this regard are very limited. We have information from a singular western wear manufacturer, Lucchese, at a time when Mr. Thomas was representing several others as well. The fact that the singular manufacturer sells western wear provides substantiation for the taxability of the transactions. Here, again, as above, the statutory definition of "gross receipts" under Section 7-9-3.5 (A)(1) states: "gross receipts' means the total amount of money or the value of other consideration received from selling property in New Mexico." The sale of western wear is generally taxable, as it is tangible personal property.

The letter offered into evidence provides no assertion of an applicable deduction taken by the seller, Lucchese, and, if so, what amount of Taxpayer's commissions might have derived

from such deductible underlying transaction(s). The existence of any deduction taken by the manufacturer/wholesaler on the sales negotiated by Mr. Thomas is completely absent. Hence, whether the sales receipts from the manufacturer/wholesalers were in fact deducted is not based in the documentation, but left entirely to speculation. Nevertheless, the letter provides one important fact, that the retailers who bought Lucchese's wares then resold the property to consumers. It is this fact that the Taxpayer uses as a foothold for Taxpayer's claim of "deductibility."

Deductibility of sales transactions between manufacturers and retailers.

Instead of evidence that the transactions he negotiated between manufacturers and retailers actually were deducted, Taxpayer focused his efforts on whether a deduction *could* apply.

Taxpayer's specific claim was that under NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-47 (effective 1994-June 30, 2021)², sales he negotiated between manufacturers and retailers who then resell the merchandise are allowed a deduction for "[r]eceipts from selling tangible personal property or licenses may be deducted from gross receipts ... if the sale is made to a person who delivers a nontaxable transaction certificate to the seller." The regulation interpreting Section 7-9-66, Regulation 3.2.225.12 NMAC (6/14/2001), states "[r]eceipts derived from commissions on sales of tangible personal property, the receipts from which sales are either exempted from the gross receipts tax or *deductible* from gross receipts, may be deducted from gross receipts." (emphasis added).

While it is true that a manufacturer/seller who sells to a retailer, who then resells to an end customer *may* obtain a Type 2 NTTC in order to support a deduction from its gross receipts

² NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-47 was amended in 2021 (outside the scope of the timeframe at issue here) to reflect the ability of buyers to provide either a nontaxable transaction certificate to the seller or alternative evidence, pursuant to Section 7-9-43.

tax for the particular transaction(s), there is nothing in the record that provides evidence that this actually occurred with Lucchese or any other manufacturer with whom Taxpayer dealt.

The deduction allowed by Section 7-9-47 can be summarized as a deduction for the sales transactions which take place before the tangible personal property reaches the end user. This is an important feature of the New Mexico gross receipts tax system that prevents multiple taxable occurrences (pyramiding or stacking) before the product gets to the end user. Because this deduction exists, although there may be several levels of sales, there remains only a single sales event which requires the seller to remit tax – the sale from the retailer to the end user – that is subject to the gross receipts tax.

Taxpayer showed that the transaction between manufacturers and retailers was "deductible" under the statute, as it was "able" to be "deducted." Regulation 3.2.225.12 NMAC. The "-ible" is an adjective suffix meaning "capable of..." *See* "Able." Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/able. (Last accessed May 23, 2024). Because the sales transaction between manufacturer and retailer is capable of being deducted, it is *deductible*. In this instance, the underlying transaction of sales from a wholesaler to a retailer is capable of being deducted under Section 7-9-47.

But whether the manufacturers took advantage of this deduction (or any other deduction or exemption) cannot be assumed and must rely on evidence. One of the technical requirements for a taxpayer taking the deduction outlined in Section 7-9-47 requires the buyer to deliver a nontaxable transaction certificate (NTTC) (or alternative evidence) to the seller. Other evidence of a deduction or exemption might suffice, but here there is none. *See* FYI-204, Nontaxable Transaction Certificates (NTTCs). Alternative evidence may include invoices or contracts, documentation of the purchaser's use or disposition of the property, a statement from the purchasers indicating an

intention to resell the property, or other evidence that establishes entitlement to a deduction. *Id*. Here, no documentary evidence from any source supports the claim that the manufacturer took a deduction from its sales, or that retailers resold the property.

In the Matter of the Protest of Marc A. Gelinas, Decision and Order No. 18-02, issued January 9, 2018 (non-precedential), considered the taxability of commissions generated from sales of prosthetic devices. The Department argued that the taxpayer in *Gelinas* could not satisfy the seller's requirements under Section 7-9-73 in order to claim the deduction because he could not produce the required NTTCs.

The hearing officer in *Gelinas* observed that the taxpayer need not satisfy the seller's requirements of that statute because the taxpayer was not the "seller" under Section 7-9-73. Instead, the taxpayer in *Gelinas* was a commissioned sales representative meaning that the statute directly applicable to the taxpayer's claim was NMSA 1978, Section 7-9-66. Section 7-9-73, although relevant to the determination of taxability under Section 7-9-66, was not directly applicable to receipts derived from commissions from sales of prosthetic devises. Ultimately, the hearing officer determined based on all of the evidence presented in that case that the taxpayer established a right and entitlement to the deduction under Section 7-9-66 even in the absence of NTTCs.

There are similarities between the Taxpayer here and the taxpayer in *Gelinas*. In *Gelinas*, the taxpayer submitted that because he was the middleman, negotiating sales for the seller, the manufacturers of the devices, that he was not required to or responsible for maintaining records of NTTCs, since he was not the manufacturer or distributor of the devices, i.e., the seller. Pg. 8. The hearing officer agreed. Pg. 9. This is true here, too, where the Taxpayer is the "middleman." Taxpayer is not the manufacturer or seller, nor is Taxpayer the end buyer or retailer. Taxpayer

does not take possession of the goods from the manufacturer or deliver them to the retailer.

Taxpayer's commissions were paid by the manufacturers based on the sales contracts/orders he negotiated.

However, there are differences as well between the situation in *Gelinas* and here. First, the Department in *Gelinas* did not dispute that *all* commissions derived from the sale of prosthetic devices which were deductible under Section 7-9-73. Instead, it asserted that the taxpayer's claim should fail due to the failure to possess NTTCs under Section 7-9-73.

Unlike *Gelinas*, there is no concurrence here between the parties with regard to the amount of the commissions that would be deductible if Taxpayer satisfied every other element of its claim. Establishing an amount of deductible receipts requires evidence this Taxpayer has not presented, dissimilar to the background presented by *Gelinas*.

Second, this case does not involve Section 7-9-73 which provides an explicit and focused deduction for the sale of a unique type of property to a narrow category of buyer (Section 7-9-73 includes a comprehensive list of licensed medical professionals) to be used for a specific purpose, none of which was in dispute in *Gelinas*. Because there was no dispute in *Gelinas* that all devices were purchased by qualified medical professionals for their intended medical use, the focus of the issue was on whether taxpayer was required to possess NTTCs. No such circumstances are present in this case. The Department correctly argues that western clothing in this case is different from prosthetic devises central to *Gelinas*.

Section 7-9-66, which is the statute upon which *Gelinas* was ultimately decided, has not changed since the application in *Gelinas*, and the Department's interpretation through regulation and other guidance, although updated, still does not require substantiation with NTTCs

specifically. *See* Regulation 3.2.1.18 (GG) NMAC (2012-2021); Regulation 3.2.1.18 (P) (2001); *see also* FYI-105, Gross Receipts & Compensating Taxes: An Overview (Rev. 07/2020), Pg. 16.

As mentioned above, the products *Gelinas* sold (prosthetics) are different from those the Taxpayer here sold (clothing). The Department's interpretation, as shown in FYI-105, Pg. 16, shows that the Department interprets the commission deduction to apply "on sales of tangible personal property when *the property sold* is not subject to gross receipts tax" (emphasis added). Prosthetics are a type of product expressly granted a deduction, but clothing is not. *See* Section 7-9-73.

The above-quoted language of FYI-105 presents a novel interpretation of the third prong of Section 7-9-66. To elucidate this point, we begin with the language of statute: "Receipts derived from commissions on sales of tangible personal property which are not subject to the gross receipts tax may be deducted from gross receipts." Section 7-9-66. Grammatically, there are three plural nouns (receipts, commissions, and sales) at the beginning of the sentence that could be the subject of the verb "are." Since there are no commas separating the phrase "which are not subject to the gross receipts tax," "property" cannot be the subject of the verb "are." Subjects and verbs must match number.³ The clause may be re-written as: "sales which are not subject to gross receipts tax." If there had been commas separating the clause "which are not subject to the gross receipts tax" the statute would read "Receipts derived from commissions on sales of tangible personal property, which *is* not subject to the gross receipts tax, may be deducted from gross receipts." This change of punctuation changes the number of the verb, switching "are" to "is," as the subject of the verb has changed from "sales" (a plural word) to

³ L. SUE BAUGH, ESSENTIALS OF ENGLISH GRAMMAR 27 (3rd ed., 2005). "Verbs must agree with their subject in number. Therefore, a singular subject takes a singular verb; a plural subject takes a plural verb."

"property" (a singular word, in this context). Therefore, property is not the subject; sales are the subject.

The regulation which closely interprets the statute, Regulation 3.2.1.18 (P) (6) reads similarly to the statute: "If the receipts from the underlying sale of the tangible property are exempt or deductible, the commission received by an independent contractor from selling the tangible property of another may be subject to the deduction provided by Section 7-9-66 NMSA 1978." This regulation again shows that the intended subject is the "receipts from the underlying sale," not the "property," which is exempt or deductible. FYI-105, however, by focusing on whether the "property" is exempt or deductible, unnecessarily limits the statute's core concept, that the "sales" rather than the "property" may be exempt or deductible.

Certainly, there are certain types of property that the legislature intended to be free from taxation, for example, the sale of prosthetic devices. *See Gelinas; see also* Section 7-9-73. There are also certain types of sales, the property type notwithstanding, that are intended to be beyond the reach of New Mexico taxation, for example, intermediate sales, when the buyer purchases the property for resale. *See* Section 7-9-47. The goal of statutory interpretation is to determine legislative intent, and in doing so "[w]e look primarily to the language of the statute." *Kilmer v. Goodwin*, 2004-NMCA-122, ¶18 (internal citations omitted). If the statute is clear and unambiguous we need go no further. *Id.* "The text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning." NMSA 1978, Section 12-2A-19. The statute is clear and unambiguous, as is the interpretation through regulation, but they are not properly interpreted by FYI-105's focus on "property." Therefore, the type of property sold is not the only determinative factor when considering the question of whether the "sales... are not subject to the gross receipts tax."

We then are left with the question of whether and to what extent NTTCs or other evidence may be relied upon to justify the deductibility of the sales in this instance.

Evidence of deductibility.

As noted above, whether the manufacturers took advantage of the deduction (or any other deduction or exemption) available to them cannot be assumed and relies on evidence. One of the technical requirements for a taxpayer taking the deduction outlined in Section 7-9-47 requires the buyer to deliver a nontaxable transaction certificate (NTTC) (or alternative evidence) to the seller. Other evidence of a deduction or exemption might suffice, but here there is none. *See* FYI-204, Nontaxable Transaction Certificates (NTTCs).

In *Gelinas*, the taxpayer acted as agent for manufacturers and sold *only* goods that fell into the category of implantable medical devices, i.e., prosthetics. The Department agreed that those product sales were within the scope of the statutory deduction but challenged the sufficiency of evidence presented to accept a deduction for commissions. The commission-based sales agent in *Gelinas* had no access to the same documentation as a buyer or seller in that situation, and there was limited evidence to support the claim a deduction was actually taken by the third-party seller.

Here, we have credible testimony of the Taxpayer and we have the letter from Lucchese Inc., a manufacturer. We have no evidence of or from the purported retailer(s). While NTTCs are certainly the best reliable evidence, as they cover the second party to the contract, the retailer, giving an affirmative statement that the products are being purchased for resale. NTTCs may not be available to a sales agent, who is neither the buyer nor the seller.

Conceptually, the Taxpayer was correct in its interpretation of the statutes. However, this may be cold comfort because, despite presenting a colorable legal claim, Taxpayer failed (unlike the taxpayer in *Gelinas*) to provide evidence to establish that any amount of his commissions

could apply the deduction to which he could have been entitled. Sales receipts, purchase orders, sales reports, a listing of commissions paid and by whom, even 1099s, were not presented. While such granular evidence may not be required to establish every transaction was deductible, some modicum of evidence is necessary. Evidence presented simply did not touch any basis on which specific amounts were deductible under Section 7-9-47 and would be deducted by Taxpayer under Section 7-9-66.

Gelinas is not only distinguishable based on the applicable law, but also on the facts and evidence presented. For this reason, the hearing officer does not read Gelinas to stand for the proposition that a blanket deduction for independent contractor commissions applies without requiring evidence that the seller took the allowed deduction.

First, because independent salespeople paid on commission provide a sales service, and services are subject to gross receipts. Regulation 3.2.1.18 (GG) (1) NMAC (2012-2021):

Commissions and other consideration received by an independent contractor from performing a sales service in New Mexico with respect to the tangible or intangible personal property of other person are gross receipts whether or not the other person reports and pays gross receipts tax with respect to the receipts from the sale of the property... Receipts, whether in the form of commissions or other remuneration, of the person performing a sales service in New Mexico are gross receipts of the person performing the sales service.

Second, under Regulation 3.1.6.12 (A) NMAC, "the taxpayer has the burden of coming forward with some countervailing evidence tending to dispute the factual correctness of the assessment." The Court of Appeals has determined that "[t]he regulation's call for 'some countervailing evidence' that 'tend[s]' to dispute the assessment, 3.1.6.12(A) NMAC, is merely a threshold requirement for evidence, and that evidence need not be credible or ultimately persuasive." *Gemini Las Colinas, LLC v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 2023-NMCA-039, ¶ 25, 531 P.3d 622, 630.

The hearing officer in *Gelinas* was persuaded that the taxpayer overcame its evidentiary burden. In this case, the manufacturer's letter simply does not present facts that might overcome the presumption of correctness as to all the receipts Taxpayer was paid, by Lucchese or by any other manufacturer he worked for, absent impermissible speculation concerning non-parties' general and per transaction tax status, which is privileged information. Nor does the letter assign a dollar amount which may help justify a specific deduction.

The Taxpayer's testimony then is the only evidence that the transactions between wholesaler/manufacturers and retailers were non-taxable transactions. The Taxpayer did not testify as to commissions, where or from whom earned, or dollar amounts from each customer. The Taxpayer did not testify as to his personal knowledge of any particular sales contracts (which may or may not include tax) of the manufacturers or retailers. The Taxpayer did not provide copies of NTTCs he helped negotiate between manufacturers and retailers. Taxpayer testified as to his belief of what occurred between manufacturers and retailers, but provided no specific instances. Taxpayer's unsubstantiated statements are insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness that attached to the assessment. *See MPC Ltd. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't*, 2003-NMCA-021, ¶13, 133 N.M. 217, 62 P.3d 308; *see also* Regulation 3.1.6.12 (A) NMAC (1/15/01). Therefore, the Taxpayer did not meet the threshold burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness.

Even if Taxpayer, for the sake of argument, may be found to have met the threshold burden of production of evidence and thus overcame the presumption of correctness, the Department's presentation of Mr. Pacheco as witness showed no basis for a deduction, supporting the Department's assessment, and Taxpayer did not ultimately carry his burden of persuasion that he was entitled to the claimed deduction. The burden is on taxpayers to prove that they are entitled to

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an exemption or deduction, if one should potentially apply. See Pub. Serv. Co. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2007-NMCA-050, ¶141 N.M. 520, 157 P.3d 85; see also Till v. Jones, 1972-NMCA-046, 83 N.M. 743, 497 P.2d 745. "Where an exemption or deduction from tax is claimed, the statute must be construed strictly in favor of the taxing authority, the right to the exemption or deduction must be clearly and unambiguously expressed in the statute, and the right must be clearly established by the taxpayer." See Sec. Escrow Corp. v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1988-NMCA-068, ¶8, 107 N.M. 540, 760 P.2d 1306; see also Wing Pawn Shop v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 1991-NMCA-024, ¶16, 111 N.M. 735, 809 P.2d 649; see also Chavez v. Comm'r of Revenue, 1970-NMCA-116, ¶7, 82 N.M. 97, 476 P.2d 67.

To the extent that the deduction under Section 7-9-66 does not apply, receipts from commissions by a non-employee agent are taxed. See Regulation 3.2.1.19 NMAC.

Conclusion

The Taxpayer was unable to overcome the presumption of correctness in the assessment by providing evidence of a deduction, with evidence of NTTCs or other evidence, that might show that the sales he negotiated between manufacturers and retailers actually took advantage of the deductions available to them under the statutes and were not subject to gross receipts tax. And although Taxpayer was correct that the statute allowing deductions for commissions was broader than the Department's narrow interpretation, the evidence to support taking the deduction was insufficient, both as a matter of overcoming the presumption of correctness, and as substantive proof that the taxpayer was entitled to take a deduction.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Α. The Taxpayer filed a timely written protest to the Notice of Assessment of Tax and Demand for Payment issued under Letter ID number L0169584752, and jurisdiction lies over the

evidence and legal argument was insufficient to find by a preponderance of evidence that

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Taxpayer was entitled to a deduction under Section 7-9-66 stemming from various transactions 1 2 that may have been deductible by the wholesalers under Section 7-9-47. See NMSA 1978, 3 Section 7-1-18 (C) (2021); see also Gemini Las Colinas, LLC v. New Mexico Taxation & 4 *Revenue Department*, 2023-NMCA-039, ¶ 29, 531 P.3d 622. 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Taxpayer's protest **IS DENIED**. 6 DATED: September 27, 2024 Ignacia V. Galler 7 8 Ignacio V. Gallegos 9 **Hearing Officer** Administrative Hearings Office 10 Post Office Box 6400 11 Santa Fe, NM 87502 12 NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 13 14 Pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 7-1-25 (2015), the parties have the right to appeal this 15 decision by filing a notice of appeal with the New Mexico Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date shown above. If an appeal is not timely filed with the Court of Appeals within 30 days, this 16 17 Decision and Order will become final. Rule of Appellate Procedure 12-601 NMRA articulates 18 the requirements of perfecting an appeal of an administrative decision with the Court of Appeals. 19 Either party filing an appeal shall file a courtesy copy of the appeal with the Administrative 20 Hearings Office contemporaneous with the Court of Appeals filing so that the Administrative 21 Hearings Office may begin preparing the record proper. The parties will each be provided with a 22. copy of the record proper at the time of the filing of the record proper with the Court of Appeals,

1	which occurs within 14 days of the Administrative Hearings Office receipt of the docketing
2	statement from the appealing party. See Rule 12-209 NMRA.
3	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
4	On September 27, 2024 a copy of the foregoing Decision and Order was submitted to the
5	parties listed below in the following manner:
6 7	First Class Mail and E-Mail First Class Mail E-Mail
8 9	INTENTIONALLY BLANK

In the Matter of the Protest of Thomas Richards, page 25 of 25.